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Abstract
Using data from a large-scale randomized controlled trial conducted in Danish job centers,
this paper investigates the eﬀects of an intensification of mandatory return-to-work activities
on the subsequent labor market outcomes for sick-listed workers. Using variations in local
treatment strategies, both between job centers and between randomly assigned treatment and
control groups within a given job center, we compare the relative eﬀectiveness of alternative
interventions. Our results show that the use of partial sick leave increases the length of time
spent in regular employment and non-reliance on benefits, and also reduces the time spent in
unemployment. Traditional active labor market programs and the use of paramedical care
appear to have no eﬀect at all, or even an adverse eﬀect.
JEL Classification: J68, C93, I18
Keywords: Long-term Sickness; Vocational Rehabilitation; Treatment Eﬀects; Random-
ized Controlled Trial
1 Introduction
As highlighted in the OECD (2010) report on Sickness, Disability and Work, sickness policy is
rapidly moving to center stage in the economic policy agenda of most OECD countries. Bud-
getary considerations are one of the key reasons for this. Expenditure on paid sick leave in OECD
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countries amounted on average to 0.8 percent of GDP in 2007.1 Although this figure might seem
rather low, it is nevertheless a matter of great concern in the current context of growing public
deficits and debt burdens. In comparison, public spending on unemployment benefits reached
“only” 0.55 percent of GDP in the same year.2 Furthermore, absence due to sickness also implies
a reduced labor supply, lost production, and health-related costs.3
Beyond the financial aspect of paid sick leave, the reintegration of sick-listed workers into
the labor market is also a matter of great concern. Empirical research on the labor market
has shown that frequent and/or long-term spells of absence are associated with a higher risk
of unemployment (Hesselius, 2007), and can significantly reduce a worker’s subsequent earnings
or prospect of employment(Markussen, 2012). The probability that a worker will then become
inactive and dependent on a permanent disability pension also increases.
The importance of well conceived sickness policies is clear in this context. Such policies
are essential both for the sick-listed worker (in terms of his/her successful reintegration) and for
society as a whole (in view of budgetary constraints). Sickness policies have recently shifted from
being passive towards a more employment-orientated approach, aiming both at reducing benefit
dependency and increasing rates of employment.4 Taking Denmark as an example, vocational
rehabilitation measures were implemented in 16 percent of all periods of sickness benefit in the
years 2009-2011, compared to only seven percent in the period 2005-2007 (Boll et al., 2010).
Vocational rehabilitation includes traditional active labor market programs (e.g., internships),
paramedical care (e.g., physical therapy), and graded return-to-work (partial sick leave).
Our aim in this paper is twofold. First, we wish to assess the eﬀects of an intensification
of return-to-work activities on sick-listed workers’ subsequent labor market outcomes. Second,
we aim to compare the relative eﬀectiveness of the alternative interventions. Specifically, we use
results from a large-scale randomized controlled experiment conducted in Danish job centers in
2009 among newly registered sick-listed workers. The treatment lasted four months and consisted
of a combination of weekly meetings with caseworkers and intensive mandatory return-to-work
activities in the form of graded return-to-work (partial sick leave), traditional activation, and/or
paramedical care.
Our empirical strategy and key results can be summarized as follows. We first rely on a simple
diﬀerence-in-means approach to identify the causal eﬀect of oﬀering a more intensive treatment
package on the subsequent labor market outcomes for newly sick-listed workers. Specifically,
1OECD data on social expenditure, taken from the OECD (2010) report on Sickness, Disability and Work.
The term ’sickness’ refers to public and mandatory private paid sick leave programs (occupational injury and
other sickness-related daily allowances).
2OECD data on Labour Market Programmes, extracted from OECD data bank (http://stats.oecd.org/). As
for Denmark—the country under consideration in this paper—expenditure on paid sick leave amounted to 1.4
percent, while public spending on unemployment benefit reached 0.96 percent of GDP in 2007.
3According to the Danish Ministry of Employment, absence due to sickness (short and long term) in 2006
reduced the supply of labor by five percent, which implies a cost of more than two percent of GDP.
4Refer to OECD (2010) for an outline of the main trends in recent reforms across the OECD.
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we estimate a causal intention-to-treat eﬀect on four outcome variables: accumulated weeks in
regular employment, self-suﬃciency (i.e., all forms of non-reliance on benefits), sickness, and
unemployment. Second, in the spirit of Markussen and Røed (2014), we exploit variation in
local treatment strategies, both between job centers and between treatment and control groups
within a given job center, to compare the relative eﬀectiveness of the alternative measures used.
Our findings reveal firstly that the experimental intervention as a whole has been ineﬀective.
Sick-listed workers initially assigned to the treatment group spent less time in regular employment
and self-suﬃciency than their peers in the control group. Nevertheless, our results also show that
a greater emphasis on oﬀering graded return-to-work programs is associated with an increase in
regular employment and self-suﬃciency, and lower unemployment. On the other hand, traditional
activation and paramedical care appear to have either no impact at all, or even an adverse impact.
Taken in the round, our results suggest that programs focusing on graded return-to-work are the
most eﬀective in improving sick-listed workers’ subsequent labor outcomes. These programs
are associated with strong and long-lasting eﬀects, but only for workers sick-listed from regular
employment and for those with physical (non-mental) disorders.
In line with the rich literature on the eﬀectiveness of active labor market policies for unem-
ployed workers (see Card et al. (2010) for a meta-analysis), our study relates to the expanding
literature on the impacts of return-to-work policies for (long-term) sick-listed workers.5 Return-
to-work can be associated with various forms of interventions, including workplace-based6, edu-
cational, medical, and social interventions. The results are mixed, however; Frölich et al. (2004)
for example, found that rehabilitation programs for the long-term sick (more than four weeks) in
Sweden had no favorable eﬀects at all, but that workplace interventions were less damaging than
the alternative strategies. In a randomized study of the inflow of Swedish sick-listed individuals,
Engström et al. (2015) found some negative eﬀects associated with having early meetings to
assess individuals’ work capacity (more sickness absence and a higher probability of receiving
disability benefits). In contrast, Everhardt and de Jong (2011) found strong positive impacts of
return-to-work activities for long-term (nine months) sick employees in the Netherlands in terms
of their likelihood of returning to work.
Some of the literature on workplace-based interventions focuses specifically on the eﬀects of
graded return-to work programs, i.e., some combination of part-time work and sickness benefits.7
5There is also another branch of the literature that relates to the impacts of return-to-work policies for tem-
porary disabled workers. See for instance Aakvik et al. (2005) and Markussen and Røed (2014) for a study of
the Norwegian Vocational Rehabilitation program. While there is no absolute definition of long-term sick leave,
workers typically call on a temporary disability insurance system following a period of sick pay (which is more
generous than the disability insurance); however this is available only for a limited period of time (usually around
one year).
6Reviewing recent medical research, Van Oostrom et al. (2009) concluded that workplace interventions are
eﬀective in reducing sickness absence among workers with musculoskeletal disorders compared with normal forms
of care, although they are not eﬀective in improving health outcomes.
7Partial sick leave and partial sickness benefits are currently available in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and
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While accurate and reliable evidence remains scarce, Markussen et al. (2012) provides an excep-
tion. Using data collected from Norwegian administrative registers, the authors concluded that
the use of graded (partial) rather than non-graded (full) sickness absence certificates reduces
the length of periods of absence, and significantly improves the propensity for employment in
subsequent years. Andrén and Svensson (2012) found that Swedish employees with musculoskele-
tal disorders assigned to part-time sick leave were more likely to recover to full work capacity
than those assigned to full-time sick leave. From a randomized controlled trial performed in
Finland among 63 patients with musculoskeletal disorders, Viikari-Juntura et al. (2012) showed
that part-time sick leave reduced both the time taken to return to regular duties and the amount
of sickness absence in the one-year follow-up period. In the Danish graded return-to-work pro-
gram, Høgelund et al. (2010) found that participation in such a program significantly increased
the probability that sick-listed workers returned to regular working hours. However, Nielsen
et al. (2014) showed that its eﬀect on the return to self-support diﬀered substantially among
the municipalities, and therefore warned against generalizing the results of the study to other
Danish municipalities. Moreover, Høgelund et al. (2012) found no impact of the Danish graded
return-to-work program for workers with mental health problems.
Based on a large-scale experimental design, the present study adds to the existing literature by
oﬀering a comprehensive evaluation of intensive mandatory return-to-work activities (activation
requirements). In particular, we focus not only on workplace-based interventions but also on
paramedical care, and thus compare the relative eﬀectiveness of alternative intensive interventions
(traditional activation vs. paramedical care vs. partial sick leave). We also consider all kind of
diseases rather than focusing on a specific subsample of sick-listed workers as others have done.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 includes details of the randomized
experiment. Section 3 is a description of the data and variables. Section 4 provides an explanation
of the empirical strategy, and section 5 contains the findings. Some conclusions are given in
Section 6.
2 The randomized experiment
The Danish sick-leave policy In Denmark, all employees, all self-employed, and all indi-
viduals receiving unemployment insurance benefits are entitled to receive compensation for each
day they cannot work due to sickness (whether the sickness is work-related or not), provided
they have worked at least 120 hours within the thirteen successive weeks prior to their sickness
absence. Although the benefit period can be extended to more than a year under certain spe-
Finland. The authorities have strongly promoted the use of these in recommending partial sick leave as the
mechanism of choice, where sick leave is needed. See Kausto et al. (2008) for a review of the use of partial sick
leaves in the Nordic countries. A similar arrangement has also been in place in the UK since 2010 (known here
as the “Fit Note”).
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cific conditions, sickness benefits are normally available for a maximum of 52 weeks within an
eighteen-month period. The employer finances the first 21 days of the sickness absence8, while
municipalities are then responsible for funding the remaining period.
The municipalities play a key role in the return-to-work process. Besides managing sickness
absence and work rehabilitation, it is their responsibility to monitor and assess recipients of
sickness benefits. More precisely, municipalities must conduct an assessment of all sickness
benefit cases no later than the eighth week of the sickness absence, and every fourth week
from then on (or every eighth week in less complicated cases). Follow-up assessments must
rely on updated and coordinated medical, social, and vocational information. The aim of these
mandatory follow-up interviews is first to verify that the sick-listed individual is actually eligible
for the benefit (i.e., s(he) has a work incapacity) and second, to help him or her to return to work
as quickly as possible. Municipal case managers can implement various vocational rehabilitation
measures, from job counselling to wage-subsidized job training and professional courses, and
including graded return-to-work (partial sick leave).
It is worth noting that municipalities have economic incentives to reintroduce sick-listed
individuals to the workplace because the state reimburses their expenditure on sickness benefit
to varying degrees, depending on whether any return-to-work activities are implemented or not.
Municipalities also have an incentive both to reduce expenditure on sickness benefit because
the entitlement to reimbursement only applies to cases lasting less than 52 weeks, and to use
part-time (rather than full-time) sick-listing, because this also reduces the final burden on them.
Finally, if despite medical treatment and vocational rehabilitation the sick-listed worker is
unable to return to ordinary employment, the municipality may refer him or her to a permanent
wage-subsidized job (fleksjob) with reduced working hours and special tasks. To be eligible for a
fleksjob, the sick-listed worker must have a permanently reduced work capacity of at least 50 per-
cent and be no older than 65. The main diﬀerence between a fleksjob and graded return-to-work
is that subsidized employment in a fleksjob is granted for an unlimited time while participation
in a graded return-to-work program is always temporary. If the sick-listed individual cannot
return to a fleksjob, the municipality may award disability benefits.
The experiment In early 2009, the National Labor Market Authority in Denmark launched
a randomized controlled trial (hereafter RCT) to test at a small scale some of the elements
that were to be included in the forthcoming legislation on active interventions relating to those
receiving sickness benefits.9 The overall purpose of this experiment was to examine whether sick-
listed workers who behave in a more proactive way during their sickness period can achieve a
8At the time of the experiment (2009), the employer was required to finance the first fourteen days of the
illness period; the rules on this changed in October 2009.
9A new and intensified treatment package was eventually rolled out nationally (with adjustments) in late 2009,
when a new law governing the return-to-work of sick-listed workers was passed in Denmark.
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greater degree of autonomy (in terms of returning to work and staying in work) than they would
have done had they not behaved proactively. The present study is a report on the outcomes of
this experiment.
The experiment was designed as an RCT conducted in 16 job centers across Denmark, with
“random” assignment to treatment by birth year, even or odd. A total of 5,652 newly sick-listed
workers were covered by the experiment, of which 2,795 were assigned to the control group
and 2,857 to the treatment group.10 Individuals were notified that they had been assigned to
the treatment group during the first follow-up meeting (no later than the eighth week of their
sickness absence) by means of a standard letter from The National Labor Market Authority.
Newly registered sick-listed workers born in odd years were subject to intensive eﬀorts (treatment
group), while those born in even years were subject to normal levels of eﬀort (control group).
Although assignment to treatment was predetermined, not random, we nevertheless consider our
study to be an RCT; individuals were not made aware of the assignment mechanism, and a
person’s birth year is “random” from his/her own perspective.
The treatment lasted 18 weeks and consisted of a combination of weekly meetings with
caseworkers AND intensive mandatory return-to-work activities in the form of either a graded
return-to-work (partial sick leave) and/or traditional activation and/or paramedical care. More
precisely, traditional activation includes vocational guidance advice and courses aimed at enhanc-
ing skills, together with internships and on-the-job training. Paramedical care consists of courses
on handling one’s own situation, psychological consultations, nutritional counselling, and exercise
including back exercises and other physical training. Lastly, the aim of the graded return-to-work
measure is to support employees with reduced work ability to continue and return to work via
partial sick leave. This involves working part-time (a reduction in working hours by at least four
hours per week) and receiving a partial sickness benefit for the hours oﬀ work, on top of a partial
salary (at a normal hourly rate). The underlying idea is that most sick leave days are a result of
non-communicable diseases, and a person’s work capacity while sick may be reduced but it is not
nothing. The return to regular working hours should take place as soon as possible, and certainly
within the 52-weeks payment period of full sickness benefits. Graded return-to-work must be
implemented with the agreement of the employer, the sick-listed worker, and the municipality. In
practice, either the sick-listed worker and the employer arrange a graded return-to-work on their
own initiative and then ask the municipality to approve this, or the municipality determines that
the sick-listed worker is able to work part-time and therefore asks him or her to agree a graded
return-to-work with the employer. If the sick-listed worker refuses to enrol in the program even
though the municipal case manager recommends it, the sick benefit can be reduced.
10Table A1 in the Appendix shows the number of individuals by employment region, job center and treatment
status.
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Within four weeks of the first interview, individuals in the treatment group were required
to participate in some kind of program (graded return-to-work, traditional activation and/or
paramedical care) for at least ten hours a week for up to four months. Table 1 provides details of
the extent of these return-to-work activities. Compared with the control group, it is clear that
the treatment group received more intensive programs of treatment. For treated individuals, the
number of return-to-work activities (all three types) was higher, and the interventions generally
began earlier and lasted longer.
Table 1: Number of return-to-work activities by type and treatment status
Type Control group
(N=2,795)
Treatment group
(N=2,857)
Panel A: Traditional activation
Total number of weeks in traditional activation 1,111 6,129
Total number of traditional activation spells 97 512
... of which counselling and training 81 417
... of which on-the-job training 16 95
Avg. week in which the 1st traditional activation spell beginsa 6.5 4.6
Avg. length of traditional activation spells (in weeks)b 11.9 12.5
Panel B: Paramedical care
Total number of weeks in paramedical care 505 11,314
Total number of paramedical care spells 42 1,107
... of which courses in handling one’s own situation 19 228
... of which psychologist 1 64
... of which nutritional counselling 0 63
... of which exercise 16 326
... of which back exercises or other physical training 4 166
... of which other 2 260
Avg. week in which the 1st paramedical care spell beginsa 5.4 3.5
Avg. length of paramedical care spells (in weeks)b 12.6 14.4
Panel C: Graded return-to-work
Number of initiated programs 366 566
Avg. week in which the program beginsa 5.7 4.5
a Measured in weeks since first follow-up meeting with the municipal caseworker (typically eight weeks
after the onset of illness).
b When calculating the average length of activation spells in weeks, uninterrupted sequences of alternative
activities are treated as a single spell (93 spells in the control and 492 spells in the treatment group).
Similarly for the average length of paramedical care spells in weeks (40 spells in the control and 787 spells
in the treatment group).
Moreover, the outcome from the first follow-up meeting with the municipal caseworker (eight
weeks after the onset of illness) could also be a total program exemption for some sick-listed
workers. As shown in Table 2, around 13 percent of all participants in the experiment were
excused from any kind of return-to-work activity, mainly because therapy was a hindrance (52
percent of all cases of exemption), or because of a pregnancy-related illness (44 percent of cases).
Exemption rates were higher in the treatment group (around 17 percent) than in the control group
(almost ten percent). However, the exempted are still included in the analysis. Specifically,
those exempted from the treatment group received the treatment as usual (i.e., the same as
individuals in the control group) and are included in the treatment group. Those exempted from
the control group also received the normal amount of return-to-work activity (even though they
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were excused). We account for this significant number of “no-shows” by estimating intention-to-
treat eﬀects, so our results could be valid even given imperfect compliance.
Table 2: Number of individuals excused/not excused by reason and treatment status
Control group Treatment group
Excused 272 496
... of which early retirement 7 14
... of which terminal illness 3 2
... of which pregnancy-related illness 167 174
... of which therapy was a hindrance 95 306
Not excused 2,523 2,361
Total 2,795 2,857
Notes: The table shows the number of individuals excused/not excused by treatment status. The exempted
are included in the analysis because exemption rates were higher in the treatment group than in the control
group. Specifically, those exempted from the treatment group received the treatment as usual (i.e., the
same as individuals in the control group) and are included in the treatment group. Those exempted from
the control group also received the normal amount of return-to-work activity (even though they were
excused).
Finally, it is worth noting that the job centers were responsible for the organization of the
experiment. They carried out interviews and decided on the composition and content of any
vocational rehabilitation, accounting for the individuals’ needs and adapting to local conditions.
Therefore, some variations in treatment intensity between job centers may be assumed. From
Figure 1, it is very clear that there is substantial variation in the intensity of return-to-work
activities, both between the 16 job centers covered by the experiment, and between treatment
and control groups within a given job center.11 As we explain in Section 4, we exploit this
variation in local treatment strategies to compare the eﬀectiveness of the alternative return-to-
work activities (graded return-to-work, traditional activation, and paramedical care).
3 Data and variables
The empirical analysis is based on four diﬀerent data sets. First, we exploit unique Danish data
derived from the controlled field experiment described above. These data include binary variables
for each type of return-to-work activity (graded return, traditional activation and paramedical
care) and for each meeting scheduled/held, as well as the number of hours per week in each type
of activation and the timing of the intake. We can therefore follow participation accurately on a
weekly basis. The data also include information about possible exemption from activation and
the job center is identified in each case.
Second, from the DREAM register we obtained information about the type of social welfare
benefit received in a given week12, and about individual characteristics. DREAM is an amalga-
11Similarly, the overall management of the usual vocational rehabilitation is regulated by law, but the assessment
and the implementation of individual cases are controlled at job center level. Therefore, there is also substantial
variation in the intensity of return-to-work activities among the control group.
12The classification scheme includes all types of public income transfer schemes in Denmark. If a citizen does
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Figure 1: Traditional activation, paramedical care and graded return-to-work intensities by job center and
treatment status
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mation of information from several diﬀerent sources, and is updated once per month by the The
National Labor Market Authority.13 Data from the DREAM register were obtained from the
week in which the experiment began (i.e., between the first week of January 2009 and the third
week of November 2009) up to the end of 2012, allowing a three-year follow-up. Specifically, we
constructed four outcome variables from the DREAM database, using the weekly information on
social transfer payments, namely the cumulative number of weeks spent in regular employment
(i.e., employed), in non-reliance on benefits (i.e., self-suﬃciency), in sickness and in unemploy-
ment, where self-suﬃciency covers the oﬃcially designated success criteria and covers all periods
of non-benefit (self-suﬃciency without employment, employment, and ordinary education).14
Besides the treatment package, our explanatory variables include age, gender, marital status,
country of origin (three categories—Denmark, western, and non-western countries), the state
before sickness (three categories—job, unemployment benefits and self-suﬃciency), the duration
of elapsed sickness at the start of the experiment, the proportion of time spent on sickness
payments (in each of the three years before the sickness), and the same proportion for time
spent on public income support of any kind (also in each of the three years before the sickness).
Table 3, which shows means and standard deviations of the explanatory variables by treatment
status, suggests that there are very few observed diﬀerences between the treatment and control
groups.15 “Random” assignment based on birth year—even or odd—successfully balanced groups.
The most significant diﬀerence, though nonetheless, relates to the status before sickness: the
treatment group was on average in regular employment slightly less than the control group (76.3
vs. 79.9 percent), and in unemployment slightly more (17.4 against 14.2 percent).
Third, from Statistics Denmark we obtain data on socio-economic characteristics at the
municipality level. In particular, for each municipality, we collected annual data on the total
fertility rate, average age, and life expectancy for new born babies. We obtained quarterly
information on the proportion of the working-age population with no more than ten years of
schooling, on external and internal migration as a percentage of the population, and on the
number of reported criminal oﬀences per capita. As for the local labor market conditions, we
calculated quarterly ratios as a percentage of the labor force for the working-age population
outside the labor force, or receiving sickness benefits, or employed in the primary sector, as well
not receive social benefits in a given period, it is represented by empty week-variables.
13The week-variables are only allowed to contain one type of compensation code at a time. This implies that
the types of social benefits are ranked. The ranking implies that if a citizen changes the type of social benefit in
the middle of a week, only the highest ranked type is registered that week.
14More precisely, we first generated indicators for regular employment, sickness, and unemployment using the
variable “status” from the DREAM register (i.e., the weekly information on labor market status). The outcome
variable regular employment is defined using status 500 (i.e., the regular employment indicator is equal to one if
the variable status is equal to 500). Similarly, the sickness indicator is based on statuses 890 to 899, while the
unemployment indicator is generated from statuses 111, 112, 124, 125, 130 to 138, 200 to 300, and 730 to 738.
Having defined these indicators, we computed the cumulative number of weeks spent in each state.
15Table A2 in the Appendix shows the means and standard deviations of the explanatory variables by treatment
status for the sample of 4,728 individuals (see later).
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Table 3: Pre-treatment characteristics by treatment status (N=5,652)
Variable Control group Treatment group Diﬀerence
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Panel A: Socio-demographic characteristics
< 30 years old 0.161 (0.367) 0.144 (0.351) -0.016*
30-39 years old 0.244 (0.429) 0.238 (0.426) -0.006
40-49 years old 0.259 (0.438) 0.269 (0.444) 0.010
> 49 years old 0.337 (0.473) 0.349 (0.477) 0.012
Male 0.407 (0.491) 0.427 (0.495) 0.021
Married 0.597 (0.491) 0.581 (0.493) -0.016
Danish origin 0.875 (0.330) 0.877 (0.328) 0.002
Western origin 0.046 (0.210) 0.047 (0.211) 0.001
Non-western origin 0.078 (0.269) 0.076 (0.264) -0.003
Panel B: Labor market history
Sick-listed from regular empl. 0.799 (0.401) 0.763 (0.426) -0.036***
Sick-listed from UI-benefits 0.142 (0.350) 0.174 (0.379) 0.031***
Sick-listed from self-empl. 0.059 (0.236) 0.063 (0.244) 0.004
Elapsed sickness durationa 7.841 (6.414) 7.621 (6.258) -0.220
Time spent on sickness-ben.b 0.188 (0.147) 0.188 (0.149) -0.001
Time spent on sickness-ben.c 0.075 (0.174) 0.076 (0.173) 0.001
Time spent on sickness-ben.d 0.066 (0.164) 0.064 (0.162) -0.003
Degree of pub. inc. supportb e 0.302 (0.257) 0.311 (0.263) 0.009
Degree of pub. inc. supportc e 0.220 (0.320) 0.220 (0.321) -0.001
Degree of pub. inc. supportd e 0.244 (0.343) 0.243 (0.340) -0.001
Panel C: Diagnoses
Back and neck disorders 0.142 (0.367) 0.160 (0.367) 0.018*
Moving incapacity 0.189 (0.391) 0.195 (0.396) 0.006
Musculoskeletal disorders 0.035 (0.184) 0.046 (0.209) 0.011**
Cardiovascular diseases 0.048 (0.214) 0.047 (0.212) -0.001
Stomach/liver/kidney diseases 0.036 (0.188) 0.031 (0.174) -0.005
Mental health problems 0.300 (0.458) 0.292 (0.455) -0.008
Chronic pain 0.007 (0.082) 0.009 (0.093) 0.002
Cancer 0.032 (0.176) 0.038 (0.191) 0.006
Other 0.211 (0.408) 0.183 (0.386) -0.029***
Number of observations 2,795 2,857
a at start of experiment (in weeks) b in year before sickness c in second last year before sickness d in
third last year before sickness e any kind of public income support.
Significance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
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as the number of full-time unemployed each quarter as a percentage of the labor force.
Finally, jobindex.dk is a collection of all the vacancies posted on the internet (online newspa-
pers, job centers, job databases, etc.), which provides us with monthly information on the number
of open vacancies and newly opened vacancies per unemployed person. We used this informa-
tion to control for local environment characteristics when exploiting the variation in treatment
strategies across job centers.
4 Empirical strategy
4.1 The eﬀect of the treatment bundle as a whole
Our first aim is to identify the overall causal eﬀect of oﬀering the intensified treatment package
on sick-listed workers’ subsequent labor market outcomes. We may write
Yi = 0 + ZZi +Xi + "i (1)
where Yi is the outcome of individual i (we consider four diﬀerent measures, see below), Zi
is a treatment status indicator equal to unity for clients assigned to the treatment group (zero
otherwise), and Xi is the vector of pre-treatment characteristics summarized in Table 3 (with age
entering linearly, not as a dummy-coded categorical predictor). Because treatment assignment
is essentially random, Zi will, by design, be independent of Xi and of any other (observed
or unobserved) pre-treatment variable.16 The coeﬃcient Z corresponds to the (conditional)
diﬀerence in the means of outcome variable Yi between treated and controls. It identifies the
intention-to-treat (ITT) eﬀect E(YijZi = 1)   E(YijZi = 0) if E("ijZi) = E("i). This is likely
to hold given that Zi is assigned at random. The experimental impact estimate bOLSZ can be
interpreted causally; it is unbiased and consistent.
Regarding the dependent variable in equation (1), Yi, we consider four measures evaluated at
diﬀerent points in time: the number of weeks in (i) regular employment, (ii) self-suﬃciency, (iii)
sickness, and (iv) unemployment during the first, second, and third year after randomization.17
The self-suﬃciency measure is meant to cover all forms of non-benefit receipt. It encompasses
individuals in regular (i.e., wage) employment, as well as self-employed, housewives and everyone
else not receiving public income transfers.18
Additionally, in order to trace the trajectory of treatment eﬀects over time in greater de-
tail, let Y 0i be an alternative set of response variables denoting the cumulative total number of
16It immediately follows that conditioning on Xi should leave bOLSZ unaﬀected. At the same time, we expect
a reduction in the residual variance to be accompanied by an increase in precision.
17All individuals can be followed for 141 weeks, and outcome variables referring to the third year (up to 156
weeks) after enrolment are non-missing for all but eight individuals.
18Exceptions are (subsidized) adult apprentices (“Voksenlærlinge”) and individuals receiving state educational
support (“Statens Uddannelsesstøtte”). Both groups are considered to be self-suﬃcient.
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weeks—running sums counting from the week of intake—in each of the four labor market statuses
described above. We evaluate each of these outcomes at each week starting from the week of
(individual) intake and ending with the 156th week after randomization (implying a total of 156
regressions per outcome variable). The results are presented graphically.
Besides its ease of use, the main advantage of the identification strategy discussed above is
that it produces informative estimates even in the presence of imperfect compliance. Recall that
there are a significant number of “no-shows”: more than one out of every six sick-listed workers
assigned to treatment received treatment as usual (see Table 2). Under these conditions, the
proposed experimental evaluation design (ITT) is the most relevant from a policy perspective.
In fact, one of the aims of the experiment was to test the intensified treatment package on a
small scale before it was eventually rolled out nationally with minor adjustments (impact pilot).
The main drawback, however, is that a simple comparison of average labor market outcomes
between treated and non-treated (“diﬀerence in means”) only allows us to evaluate the treatment
package as a whole. Does the package work? While this question is relevant, it is clearly not the
only causal relationship of interest. In particular, we would like to attribute the overall perfor-
mance of the treatment bundle to its individual components (traditional activation, paramedical
care, graded return-to-work). Yet, since the experiment was not designed as a multi-arm trial
(the ideal experiment for answering this richer research question), isolating their individual im-
pacts is a challenge. A naive comparison of those who did and those who did not participate in
a particular treatment activity risks being biased by self-selection: observed diﬀerences in labor
market outcomes are equal to the sum of the eﬀect of the treatment on the treated and selection
bias. Unbiased estimates can only be obtained if participation is as good as randomly assigned
conditional on covariates (conditional independence)—a very strong assumption to make. In
consequence, the “diﬀerence in means approach” does not enable us to compare the relative ef-
fectiveness of the three alternative policies. Our second identification strategy, which is in spirit
of that used by Markussen and Røed (2014), addresses this methodological challenge.
4.2 Disentangling the bundle, isolating eﬀects
By exploiting variations in local treatment strategies, Markussen and Røed (2014) analyze the
eﬀectiveness of four alternative vocational rehabilitation programs for a large sample of temporary
disability benefit recipients in Norway. We follow their approach.
To begin with, recall that there is substantial variation in treatment intensities both between
the 16 job centers involved in the experiment and between the treatment and control groups
within a given job center (Figure 1). As such, there are 32 distinct “local treatment environments”,
each characterized by idiosyncratic working methods and treatment priorities. Diﬀerences in
these “treatment cultures” may be seen in, e.g., the choice and combination of treatment types,
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the speed with which newly registered clients are exposed to them, or the length of initiated
activation spells. The resulting “treatment portfolio” is shaped by each of these choices, which
may, in sum, be referred to as a “treatment strategy”. Our aim is to proxy these treatment
strategies by vectors of local treatment strategy characteristics ('i). These can, in turn, be used
to identify the eﬀects of alternative interventions.
The vectors of local treatment strategy characteristics ('i) are individual-specific and depend
on the treatment histories of all other sick-listed workers exposed to the same local treatment
regime (more on this below). Each vector contains three elements—'Si (S=traditional acti-
vation, paramedical care, graded return-to-work)—and is meant to describe “both the choice
of (first) treatment, and the speed with which it is implemented” (Markussen and Røed, 2014:
15). We estimate the vector of local treatment strategy characteristics in the framework of a
linear discrete transition rate model with competing risks. In particular, we consider exits from
a single state (“sick and untreated”) to multiple destinations: participation either in traditional
activation, in paramedical care, or in a graded return-to-work program. Although a sick-listed
individual can be exposed to a combination of alternative interventions over the course of his/her
rehabilitation, our focus lies in the choice of first treatment. Accordingly, the data pattern used
for estimation is characterized by single spells, one for each individual; repeat spells are ignored.
The survival time data at hand is an interval-censored inflow sample with weekly observations.
Now, let PSijd be a destination-specific censoring variable equal to unity (zero otherwise) if sick-
listed individual i, registered in local treatment environment j, makes a transition into treatment
S after having been untreated—and thus at risk of making the transition—for d weeks. Given
these event indicators, we organize the dataset in the following way. First, because individuals
who are not sick-listed in the week of intake (which is the case for 924 out of 5,652 experimental
units) are not at risk of being activated, they are excluded from the analysis beforehand; 4,728
individuals remain. Next, starting with a panel in person-week format, for each sick-listed worker
we remove observations after the first transition into one of the three alternative programs.
Uncompleted spells are right-censored in the absence of an event within the first 20 weeks—
recall that the treatment period is meant to last only 18 weeks—or if the sickness spell ends. In
short, the resulting panel is unbalanced and contains, for each sick-listed client, one observation
per week at risk of being activated for the first time.
Then, letting D denote a vector of duration dummies (one for each week), Xi the vector
of individual pre-treatment characteristics summarized in Table A2 in the Appendix (where all
non-binary variables, including age, enter in a quadratic fashion to allow for flexibility) and Xjd
a vector of municipality-level controls referring to local treatment environment j in week d after
randomization (socio-demographic characteristics and local labor market conditions; see Table
A3 in the Appendix for a complete list), we estimate—separately for each of the three alternative
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treatments—the following linear probability model:
PSijd = 0 +DS +XiS +Xjd#S + uSijd (2)
Markussen and Røed (2014: 16) argue that the residuals in this model have an appealing
interpretation. Particularly, the sum of individual residuals,
buSij = DSiX
d=1
buSijd (3)
where DSi corresponds to the number of weeks sick-listed worker i was at risk of making the
transition into treatment S, can “be interpreted as the estimated covariate-adjusted transition
propensity at the claimant level”. Right-censoring and duration dependence aside, buSij is equal to
the (weighted) number of “lacked” waiting weeks for transition into S compared to what one would
expect given the observed pre-treatment characteristics of client i (Xi) and the municipality-level
socio-economic characteristics of local treatment environment j (Xjd). For instance, buSij > 0
indicates that the transition happened earlier than expected.
Now, recall that the vector of local treatment strategy characteristics is intended to describe
both the choice of first treatment and the speed with which newly registered clients are exposed
to it. Specifically, the local treatment strategy characteristics relevant for individual i ('Si) may
be defined as the average covariate-adjusted transition propensity of all sick-listed workers other
than i subject to the same local treatment regime (leave-out mean):
'Si =
1
nj   1
X
k2N ij
buSkj (4)
where N ij denotes the set of individual i’s peers in local treatment environment j and nj  
1 is the cardinality of this set. Note that even though individual i’s own covariate-adjusted
transition propensity does not enter equation (4), 'Si is not completely exogenous to individual
i: individual i’s characteristics (Xi) and treatment history (summarized by PSijd) influence
the parameter estimates, predicted values, and residuals in (2), therefore all covariate-adjusted
transition propensities buSij in (3) and thus 'Si in (4). To overcome this problem, we exclude
individual i when fitting the linear probability model specified in (2). Accordingly, we estimate
4,728 linear probability models per treatment type S, excluding one individual at a time and
computing one datapoint ('Si for the excluded individual) per iteration.
Equipped with the proxies for local area practice styles, we specify the following outcome
equation:
Yi = 0 +'i+Xi +Xj! + "i (5)
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where Yi is again the outcome of individual i (we consider the same measures as in (1)), Xi
and Xj are the same individual and municipality-level socio-economic characteristics as in (2)
and 'i is the vector of local treatment strategy characteristics with elements 'Si (S=traditional
activation, paramedical care, graded return-to-work) as defined in (4).19 The coeﬃcients 
identify the impacts of marginal changes in local treatment strategies on subsequent labor market
outcomes and can thus be interpreted as intention-to-treat eﬀects. Note that this interpretation
hinges only on the assumption that local treatment strategies are as good as randomly assigned
conditional on the individual and municipality-level controls included in (5). Provided that there
is no unaccounted for purposeful sorting of sick-listed workers into treatment environments, this
assumption seems plausible.
Following Markussen and Røed (2014), we also specify a model in which program participation
indicators enter directly as right hand side variables. For this purpose, consider the following
specification:
Yi = 0 +Pi+Xi +Xj + "i (6)
where Pi is a vector whose elements PSi (S=traditional activation, paramedical care, graded
return-to-work) are indicators of actual treatment receipt. In particular, let PSi equal unity
(zero otherwise) if individual i participated in treatment activity S at some time during the first
20 weeks after enrolment.
As stressed earlier, one potential problem with (6) is that individuals may, at least in part, self-
select into their preferred program, rendering Pi endogenous if selection is based on unobserved
traits. The parameters in (6) cannot then be consistently estimated by Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS). To overcome this problem, we instrument the potentially endogenous elements of the
vector of actual treatment receipt (PSi) by the elements of the vector of local treatment strategy
characteristics ('Si). These are, arguably, valid instruments: the instruments are as good as
randomly assigned (independent of potential outcomes), relevant (partially correlated with the
endogenous treatment receipt indicators) and exogenous (uncorrelated with the unobservable
error term of the structural model). Under instrument validity, and assuming that there are
no defiers (monotonicity), the coeﬃcients  identify local average treatment eﬀects (LATEs),
i.e., the average causal eﬀects of actually participating in alternative programs for the compliant
subpopulation (Imbens and Angrist, 1994).
We argued above that exposure to a particular local treatment strategy is as good as randomly
19Note that besides Xi (see Table A2) and Xj (see Table A3), we are controlling for a large number of week
of intake dummies when estimating model (5). The same applies to the linear probability model specified in
(2) and to equation (6) below. Also note that the vector of municipality-level characteristics entering the linear
probability model in (2), Xjd, consists of time-varying variables, whereas the vector Xj in (5) is time-invariant
(variables refer to the week of intake). Arguably, transition propensities in (2) depend on current conditions,
whereas labor market outcomes in (5) depend on initial conditions.
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assigned and thus independent of potential outcomes, provided that there is no unaccounted for
purposeful sorting of sick-listed workers into treatment environments. Also note that indepen-
dence suﬃces for a causal interpretation of reduced form estimates and that equation (5) actually
corresponds to the reduced form of the instrumental variables model specified in (6). Next, it
should also be clear from the preceding discussion that the proposed instruments are, by con-
struction, strongly correlated with the potentially endogenous vector of actual treatment receipt.
Besides, the instrument relevance condition can (and will) be tested.
Regarding the exclusion restriction, we need to maintain that the only channel through
which local treatment strategies aﬀect labor market outcomes is through their eﬀect on program
participation. In particular, we need to assume that the instruments are uncorrelated with
unobserved determinants of the outcome. In what follows, we will argue that this assumption is
plausible. For this purpose, it is instructional to think of the error term in equation (6) as being
composed of two parts. The first part contains unobserved determinants of labor market success
that are peculiar to the individual sick-listed worker, i.e., unobserved individual characteristics
such as ability, motivation, or the loss in work capacity due to sickness (which is not fully captured
by controlling for diagnoses). The second part comprises all remaining factors, i.e., unobservables
that are non-specific to a particular client. This second component consists first and foremost of
(potentially unobserved) local labor market conditions and other municipality-level influences.
Now, note that, first, the set of instruments relevant for individual i is completely exogenous
to individual i in the sense that neither individual i’s characteristics nor individual i’s treatment
history have any impact on the instruments. Individual characteristics (observed or unobserved)
should therefore be orthogonal to the instrument. It remains to be argued that the same is true
for the second part of the error term. We need to maintain that local treatment cultures are
uncorrelated with unobserved local labor market conditions and other municipality-level unob-
servables determining the outcome. If we think of “treatment cultures” as being the result of
the interplay between national statutory provisions and a “combination of individual judgment,
guesswork, personal experience, and convenience” (Markussen and Røed, 2014: 6), i.e., if a treat-
ment environment’s treatment priorities are first and foremost determined by factors unrelated
to current local conditions, this requirement is arguably satisfied. Given this line of reasoning,
it should also be the case that observable municipality-level variables have no significant eﬀect
on observed treatment portfolios. To test for selection on observables, we regress the treatment
intensity indicators plotted in Figure 1 on the vector of municipality-level characteristics, Xj,
as described in Table A3 in the Appendix. For traditional activation and paramedical care,
none of the estimated coeﬃcients is statistically significant at conventional levels. Moreover, F
statistics suggest that they are also jointly insignificant. For graded return-to-work, only one
out of 16 covariates ends up being statistically significant (at the ten percent level). We take
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this as evidence in favor of the assumption that there is no selection based on (observable)
municipality-level variables; this supports the exclusion restriction.
5 Results
5.1 Evaluating the treatment package as a whole (diﬀerence in means ap-
proach)
To begin with, we present the results of evaluating the treatment package as a whole by comparing
average labor market outcomes of treated and non-treated individuals. Does oﬀering intensified
services improve sick-listed workers’ labor market prospects compared with clients receiving
treatment as usual? The answer is given in Table 4. Panel A displays unconditional intention-
to-treat eﬀects (pure diﬀerences in means) calculated by regressing the dependent variables in
columns I to IV on a treatment status indicator. Conditional intention-to-treat eﬀects, estimated
by partialling out the impacts of pre-treatment variables (socio-demographic characteristics,
individual labor market history and diagnoses), are shown in Panel B.20
It is immediately apparent from Table 4 that the experimental intervention as a whole is
ineﬀective, not to say harmful. Oﬀering the combined treatment package—a bundle consisting
of intensified traditional activation, paramedical care, and graded return-to-work programs—has,
on average, adverse impacts on subsequent labor market prospects when evaluated against the
counterfactual outcomes of sick-listed workers receiving standard services.
Regarding the outcome variables regular employment and self-suﬃciency, estimated intention-
to-treat eﬀects are negative, moderate in size, and statistically significant (at the ten, five, or
one percent level) during the first and second year after random assignment. The estimates
suggest, for instance, that oﬀering intensive rather than standard services reduces the time spent
in self-suﬃciency (non-benefit receipt) by one week on average during the first year, and one
and a half weeks during the second year (Panel B). The corresponding estimates for regular
employment are slightly smaller in absolute terms, but still sizeable, given that the non-treated
spent on average only 16.5 weeks in regular employment during the first year and 21 weeks
during the second year after randomization (Panel A). The impacts during the third year are
also unfavorable, but end up being statistically insignificant once background characteristics are
controlled for. Turning next to sickness and unemployment, the eﬀects are small in magnitude
and not statistically significant at conventional levels across all years. Oﬀering the intensified
treatment bundle instead of standard services appears to have, altogether and on average, no
discernible eﬀect on these outcomes. The graphical evidence shown in Figure 2 supports these
20As expected, we find that estimates in Panels A and B are very similar, with standard errors being smaller
in the latter.
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Table 4: Intention-to-treat eﬀects at diﬀerent points in time after randomization
Dependent variable: Number of weeks in ...
I II III IV
Regular
employment
Self-suﬃciency Sickness Unemployment
Panel A: Unconditional (not controlling for background characteristics)
Panel A1: During 1st year after random assignment (N=5,652)
ITT -1.390*** -1.395*** 0.416 0.409
(0.505) (0.516) (0.498) (0.286)
Mean in control group 16.474*** 19.828*** 19.812*** 4.779***
(0.364) (0.370) (0.356) (0.199)
Panel A2: During 2nd year after random assignment (N=5,652)
ITT -1.820*** -1.891*** 0.265 0.586
(0.593) (0.599) (0.394) (0.402)
Mean in control group 20.865*** 25.774*** 8.141*** 7.545***
(0.425) (0.426) (0.275) (0.279)
Panel A3: During 3rd year after random assignment (N=5,644)
ITT -0.842 -1.065* -0.287 0.436
(0.607) (0.614) (0.311) (0.408)
Mean in control group 20.675*** 25.705*** 5.197*** 7.366***
(0.433) (0.435) (0.223) (0.285)
Panel B: Conditional (controlling for background characteristics)
Panel B1: During 1st year after random assignment (N=5,652)
ITT -0.859* -0.981** -0.048 0.180
(0.462) (0.471) (0.465) (0.269)
Constant 14.138*** 19.404*** 18.432*** 2.168
(2.639) (3.002) (3.376) (1.580)
Panel B2: During 2nd year after random assignment (N=5,652)
ITT -1.196** -1.444*** 0.075 0.296
(0.549) (0.552) (0.388) (0.377)
Constant 25.333*** 37.295*** 9.589*** 5.056**
(3.069) (3.486) (2.892) (2.086)
Panel B3: During 3rd year after random assignment (N=5,644)
ITT -0.336 -0.760 -0.341 0.222
(0.571) (0.572) (0.310) (0.385)
Constant 28.774*** 44.856*** 4.960*** 4.874**
(3.200) (3.772) (1.874) (2.246)
Notes: The table shows the average causal eﬀect of oﬀering the intensified treatment package as a whole
(intention-to-treat). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
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findings.
Figure 2: Trajectory of treatment eﬀects (cumulative total intention-to-treat eﬀects)
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Notes: Each panel is based on 156 separate regressions (one for each week) of the cumulative total number of weeks
in (A) regular employment, (B) self-suﬃciency, (C) sickness, (D) unemployment on a treatment status dummy
and the vector of pre-treatment characteristics summarized in Table 3. The plotted intention-to-treat eﬀects
correspond to the diﬀerence in the average number of weeks spent in (A) regular employment, (B) self-suﬃciency,
(C) sickness, (D) unemployment between treated and non-treated individuals (controlling for background charac-
teristics) evaluated at a given point in time after randomization as indicated on the horizontal axes. The dashed
lines depict the corresponding pointwise robust confidence intervals at the 95 percent level. The number of ob-
servations that each regression is based on varies between 5,652 for all weeks up to and including the 141st week
after the start of the experiment (no missings) and 5,644 for the 156th week.
Figure 2 presents a magnified view of the trajectory of treatment eﬀects over time. Each panel
is based on 156 separate regressions, one for each week, of the cumulative total number of weeks
in the respective labor market status on a treatment status dummy and a vector of background
characteristics (comp. above). The time series of treatment eﬀects shown in Panel A illustrates
for example that, 156 weeks after random assignment, treated individuals spent on average four
weeks less in regular employment than the non-treated (pure diﬀerence in means). A causal
intention-to-treat eﬀect of about two and a half weeks remains after having partialled out the
impact of pre-treatment characteristics; this eﬀect is borderline significant (p-value: 0.087). The
adverse impact on non-benefit receipt is even more pronounced and accumulates in a sustained
manner over time. The monotonically decreasing cumulative total intention-to-treat eﬀect in
Panel B indicates that the self-suﬃciency rate among the treated is strictly smaller than for
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the non-treated in all weeks. The (negative) gap persists even three years after randomization
and contributes to a further decrease in the cumulative total eﬀect. One may conclude that the
adverse impact of the treatment goes well beyond an initial locking-in eﬀect. In contrast to that,
cumulative total eﬀects on sickness and unemployment are small and not statistically diﬀerent
from zero over the entire domain.
Given that the treatment group’s relative shortfall in the number of weeks spent in regular
employment and other types of self-suﬃciency is not fully matched by a relative abundance of
sickness or unemployment, the question arises into which labor market statuses the treated pre-
dominantly transited instead (compared with the non-treated). Figure 3 sheds some light on
this by plotting the trajectory of treatment eﬀects for two additional outcomes: early retirement
and fleksjob. Recall that fleksjobs are subsidized jobs targeted at individuals with a permanently
reduced work capacity due to a medical condition. Fleksjob-workers are typically not expected
ever to return to regular working hours. Figure 3 reveals that oﬀering the treatment package
promotes transitions into early retirement and fleksjobs, unintentionally we presume, for encour-
aging sick-listed workers to withdraw permanently from productive activities, be it entirely (in
the case of early retirement) or in parts (fleksjobs), clearly runs against the public interest.
Figure 3: Trajectory of treatment eﬀects for two additional outcome measures (cumulative total intention-to-
treat eﬀects)
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So far we have confined our discussion to average intention-to-treat eﬀects, i.e. to the average
eﬀect of oﬀering the treatment among all study participants. However, treatment eﬀects may vary
across experimental units for two reasons; first because diﬀerent subpopulations may respond
diﬀerently to a given treatment, and second because the composition of actual treatment activities
may diﬀer across diﬀerent subpopulations (see for instance Figure A1 in the Appendix, which
shows treatment portfolios by labor market status before sickness). In order to test for eﬀect
heterogeneity, we split the sample along two dimensions: we perform subanalyses by labor market
status before sickness (regular employment, unemployment, self-employment) and by the degree
of benefit dependency in the year prior to assignment (four quartiles). The results, which are
shown in Figures A2 and A3 in the Appendix, may be briefly summarized as follows. First, the
treatment aﬀects individuals sick-listed from regular employment and individuals sick-listed from
unemployment in the same way (adverse impacts on regular employment and self-suﬃciency, no
eﬀect on sickness and unemployment).21 Second, the adverse impact of the treatment is most
pronounced for individuals in the first quartile of the benefit dependency distribution in the year
before enrolment, i.e., for sick-listed workers with no or only short periods of prior benefit receipt.
The eﬀects within this quartile are up to three times greater than for the sample as a whole.
In sum, the treatment package as a whole comes oﬀ badly. The treated spent less time in
regular employment and other types of self-suﬃciency than their peers in the control group. The
adverse impact is moderate in magnitude and goes well beyond initial locking-in eﬀects. We
find that the treatment is most harmful for individuals with a high degree of self-suﬃciency in
the year before assignment. Lastly, the treatment promotes transitions into early retirement
and fleksjobs, both of which are one-way tickets into indefinite periods of welfare dependency,
programs of no return, and therefore dead ends on the road to successful reintegration.
5.2 Disentangling the bundle, isolating eﬀects (local treatment strategies ap-
proach)
As to the results from the “local treatment strategy approach”, have a look at Tables 5 and
6. Table 5 (OLS) displays the average intention-to-treat eﬀects of marginal changes in local
treatment strategies. The estimated impacts of actually participating in alternative treatment
activities (LATE) are shown in Table 6 (IV/2SLS). Following Markussen and Røed (2014: 19),
we have normalized the vectors of local treatment strategy characteristics by scaling its elements
'Si by the inverse of the absolute diﬀerence in the average value of 'Si between the local
treatment regimes applying the respective treatment activity S least and most. Consequently, a
unit diﬀerence corresponds to the diﬀerence described above and parameter estimates in Table 5
21For the subsample of self-employed, we lack statistical power due to the small sample size. Indeed, the eﬀects
for this group are very imprecisely estimated.
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can be interpreted as the expected change in the outcome variable “resulting from a movement
from the treatment environment giving lowest priority to the strategy under consideration to the
one giving it highest priority”. Also note that the estimates shown in Table 5 correspond to the
reduced form estimates of the IV/2SLS model that Table 6 (second stage) is based on. The first
stage is summarized by the F test of excluded instruments reported in the footer of Table 6.
Table 5: Intention-to-treat eﬀects of marginal changes in local treatment strategies at diﬀerent points in time
after randomization (OLS, reduced form estimates)
Dependent variable: Number of weeks in ...
I II III IV V VI
Regular
employ-
ment
Self-
suﬃciency
Sickness Unemploy-
ment
Early
retirement
Fleksjob
Panel A: During 1st year after random assignment (N=4,728)
'traditionalactivation -2.476* -2.133 -0.444 1.408 0.280 0.768***
(1.381) (1.401) (1.444) (0.859) (0.239) (0.268)
'paramedicalcare -2.937** -2.896** 2.073* -0.368 0.119 0.734***
(1.161) (1.178) (1.214) (0.722) (0.201) (0.225)
'gradedreturn 4.227*** 3.245** -3.538** 0.251 0.125 -0.862***
(1.578) (1.602) (1.651) (0.981) (0.273) (0.306)
Panel B: During 2nd year after random assignment (N=4,728)
'traditionalactivation -3.398** -2.610 -0.612 2.077* 0.378 1.374**
(1.656) (1.685) (1.248) (1.207) (0.655) (0.685)
'paramedicalcare -3.345** -4.055*** 1.006 1.304 0.628 1.599***
(1.392) (1.417) (1.049) (1.015) (0.550) (0.576)
'gradedreturn 3.674* 2.202 -1.446 -2.457* 0.622 -1.382*
(1.893) (1.927) (1.426) (1.380) (0.748) (0.783)
Panel C: During 3rd year after random assignment (N=4,720)
'traditionalactivation -3.199* -2.065 -0.458 0.515 0.616 1.044
(1.707) (1.723) (0.985) (1.231) (0.935) (0.958)
'paramedicalcare -0.982 -1.552 -0.594 0.652 0.860 1.531*
(1.436) (1.450) (0.829) (1.035) (0.787) (0.806)
'gradedreturn 3.689* 1.906 -0.199 -1.664 0.794 -1.355
(1.956) (1.974) (1.128) (1.410) (1.072) (1.098)
Notes: The table shows intention-to-treat eﬀects of marginal changes in local treatment strategies (re-
duced form estimates). Each panel is based on six separate OLS regressions of the number of weeks
in regular (i.e., wage) employment/self-suﬃciency/sickness/unemployment/early retirement/fleksjob on
the normalized vector of local treatment strategy characteristics and additional controls (individual and
municipality-level socio-economic characteristics; week of intake dummies). Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
The OLS estimates in Table 5 suggest that prioritizing graded return-to-work programs has
favorable eﬀects. The reduced form estimates indicate that oﬀering these programs more inten-
sively decreases the incidence of sickness during the first year after random assignment. At the
same time, they promote transitions into regular employment and other forms of self-suﬃciency.
The estimates suggest for instance that a movement from the treatment regime prioritizing
graded return-to-work programs the least to the one promoting it the most leads to an expected
decrease in the time spent in sickness of almost one month (3.5 weeks) during the first year. This
decrease is accompanied by a corresponding increase in regular employment and non-benefit re-
ceipt. We find that the favorable eﬀect on regular employment persists during the second and
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third year after enrolment. During these later years, the impacts on self-suﬃciency and sickness
are also beneficial, but not statistically significant. While the impact on early retirement cannot
be distinguished from zero, prioritizing graded return-to-work programs reduces the likelihood of
getting trapped into permanent welfare dependency by taking up subsidized employment under
a fleksjob arrangement. In sum, graded return-to-work programs are strongly associated with
improved labor market prospects. In stark contrast, giving priority to traditional activation
and paramedical care impairs subsequent performance. Both of these treatment types exert a
negative impact on the incidence of regular employment and non-benefit receipt. In addition,
oﬀering these programs more intensively appears to push sick-listed workers into fleksjobs. The
instrumental variable estimates reported in Table 6 support these findings.
Table 6: Eﬀects of participating in alternative treatment activities (LATE) evaluated at diﬀerent points in time
after randomization (IV/2SLS)
Dependent variable: Number of weeks in ...
I II III IV V VI
Regular
employ-
ment
Self-
suﬃciency
Sickness Unemploy-
ment
Early
retirement
Fleksjob
Panel A: During 1st year after random assignment (N=4,728)
Traditional activation -3.333 -2.529 -1.556 2.796* 0.403 1.066*
(2.876) (2.764) (2.985) (1.629) (0.453) (0.627)
Paramedical care -7.084** -6.551** 5.316* -0.794 0.141 1.674***
(2.761) (2.654) (2.866) (1.564) (0.434) (0.602)
Graded return 30.290** 23.777** -24.260* 1.425 0.639 -6.355**
(11.980) (11.515) (12.435) (6.787) (1.885) (2.610)
Panel B: During 2nd year after random assignment (N=4,728)
Traditional activation -4.620 -2.359 -1.539 3.396 0.116 1.672
(3.252) (3.174) (2.386) (2.410) (1.262) (1.427)
Paramedical care -7.510** -8.063*** 2.458 3.399 0.790 3.416**
(3.122) (3.048) (2.291) (2.313) (1.212) (1.370)
Graded return 27.285** 17.971 -9.886 -17.532* 3.474 -10.530*
(13.546) (13.224) (9.941) (10.038) (5.258) (5.946)
Panel C: During 3rd year after random assignment (N=4,720)
Traditional activation -5.960* -3.088 -0.377 0.830 0.350 1.110
(3.374) (3.256) (1.859) (2.361) (1.801) (1.898)
Paramedical care -3.466 -3.606 -0.931 1.942 1.101 3.314*
(3.255) (3.140) (1.793) (2.277) (1.737) (1.831)
Graded return 25.984* 14.294 -0.722 -11.517 4.372 -10.294
(14.172) (13.674) (7.808) (9.916) (7.564) (7.973)
Notes: The table shows the estimated eﬀects of participating in alternative treatment activities (local
average treatment eﬀects). Each panel is based on six separate IV/2SLS regressions (second stage). See
notes to Table 5 for a description of the outcome variables. Included instruments: see Table A2 and
Table A3 in the Appendix; week of intake dummies. Excluded instruments: vector of local treatment
strategy characteristics ('i). F test of excluded instruments (first stage): traditional activation: 228.75;
paramedical care: 480.75; graded return: 20.28. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
The table shows the estimated eﬀects of participating in alternative programs. It therefore
comes as no surprise that these statistics (LATE) tend to be greater in magnitude than those
reported in Table 5 (ITT). The estimates in Table 6 may be summarized as follows. First, both
24
traditional activation and paramedical care seem to have adverse impacts on subsequent labor
market outcomes. Participation in a traditional activation program promotes unemployment
during the first year after enrolment and is clearly not helping sick-listed workers to reintegrate
into the regular labor market. Similarly, traditional activation programs are ineﬀective in reduc-
ing the degree of welfare dependency. The eﬀects of being exposed to paramedical care are even
more detrimental. Our results indicate that participating in such a program reduces the time
spent in regular employment and self-suﬃciency by about one and a half to two months during
both the first and second year after intake. These eﬀects are highly statistically significant. And
second, letting sick-listed workers participate in graded return-to-work programs is shown to be
a very successful strategy. Participation in these programs increases the time spent in regular
employment and non-benefit receipt substantially. At the same time, we find favorable eﬀects
on sickness during the first year and on unemployment during the second year.
The 4,728 experimental units to which Table 6 refers share an important commonality: they
were sick in the (individual) week of intake. However, we must not ignore the fact that the group is
diverse in other ways. It is composed of individuals from fundamentally diﬀerent backgrounds and
experiences. It stands to reason that diﬀerent backgrounds imply diﬀerent needs, which in turn
demand diﬀerent means: one size may not fit all. We made earlier reference to the idea that the
sample can, for the purpose of separate analysis, be divided into three groups: individuals sick-
listed from regular employment, unemployment, and self-employment. Estimates of local average
treatment eﬀects by labor market attachment before sick leave are reported in Table A4.22 The
general impression is that the “full sample results” shown in Table 6 are entirely driven by the large
subsample of workers sick-listed from regular employment. Treatment eﬀects for the subsample
of unemployed individuals cannot be distinguished from zero (only one estimate is statistically
significant at conventional levels). The finding that graded return-to-work is ineﬀective for sick-
listed unemployed workers comes as no surprise, given that unemployed workers typically have
no work to return to (see also Figure A1 in the Appendix).
A second important dimension along which the study participants vary is their medical
condition. The range of conditions spans from chronic pain, cardiovascular diseases, and cancer,
to mental health problems like stress, depression, and anxiety (see Table A2 for a complete list).
Beyond doubt, diﬀerent conditions come with varying degrees of lost work capacity, which in turn
may call for diﬀerent cures. At a somewhat crude level of aggregation one can split the sample
into two groups: individuals suﬀering from a mental disorder and workers with a non-mental
illness. Table A5 shows local average treatment eﬀects for these groups. For sick-listed workers
with a non-mental condition, graded return-to-work programs perform best. While the eﬀects
22Results for the small subsample of self-employed are suppressed because estimates are too imprecise for the
findings to be considered conclusive.
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of these programs are generally positive, although imprecisely measured in some specifications,
paramedical care and traditional activation appear to have either no or even adverse impacts.
These findings correspond very well with the “full sample results” displayed in Table 6. Taken
together the empirical evidence strongly advocates the use of graded return-to-work programs
for workers sick-listed from regular employment as a result of a non-mental medical condition.
The picture for individuals with a psychiatric disorder is less clear. In fact, since none of the
estimated eﬀects exceeds its standard error, the results for this group are entirely inconclusive.
5.3 Robustness and sensitivity
Recall that the main idea of the local treatment strategy approach lies in exploiting the variation
in treatment priorities across distinct treatment environments in order to construct estimates of
the eﬀects of alternative rehabilitation programs on subsequent labor market outcomes. In a
first step, treatment strategies are proxied by vectors of local treatment strategy characteristics,
which we estimate in the framework of a competing risks transition rate model. In a second step,
these proxies are used as instruments for actual treatment events. We earlier argued that local
treatment strategy characteristics provide legitimate instruments for the potentially endogenous
program participation indicators (see Section 4.2). A key assumption is the independence of
instruments and potential outcomes: for the individual sick-listed worker, being exposed to a
particular local treatment regime is as good as randomly assigned, and so are the instruments.
As a matter of fact, much of the variation in treatment strategies is completely random because
of the experimental intervention (the variation between treatment and control group within a
given job center is truly random). This is where the present study diﬀers from earlier research
that relies on this identification strategy, above all the observational study by Markussen and
Røed (2014).
Given this setup, we consider three robustness tests. First, we isolate the truly random part of
the variation in treatment strategies by redefining the notion of a “local treatment environment”.
Up to this point, a local treatment environment has been defined to consist of a particular job
center-treatment status cell: the control group in Copenhagen constitutes for instance one local
treatment environment. This definition allows us to exploit the variation in treatment intensities
both between the 16 job centers covered by the experiment and between treatment and control
group within a given job center (32 local treatment environments). Yet, this approach has a slight
drawback: only part of the variation in treatment strategies is completely random (as discussed
above). Fortunately, the truly random part can easily be isolated by letting a local treatment
environment correspond to an individual’s treatment status (two truly randomly assigned local
treatment environments). The advantage of this approach is that it rules out purposeful sorting
into treatment regimes and thus guarantees independence. Table 7 shows the results of this
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robustness test. It is immediately apparent that our main findings (Table 6) are robust to this
alternative approach. The results are the same as before, both in terms of the direction of
the eﬀects and their statistical significance (in fact, the estimates presented here are even more
precise than those in Table 6). In particular, we again find that graded return-to-work programs
are associated with favorable eﬀects, while traditional activation and paramedical care perform
poorly.23
Table 7: Eﬀects of participating in alternative treatment activities (LATE) evaluated at diﬀerent points in time
after randomization accounting only for truly random variation between treatment and control group (IV/2SLS)
Dependent variable: Number of weeks in ...
I II III IV V VI
Regular
employ-
ment
Self-
suﬃciency
Sickness Unemploy-
ment
Early
retirement
Fleksjob
Panel A: During 1st year after random assignment (N=4,728)
Traditional activation -2.720** -2.706** -0.644 1.413** 0.065 0.790***
(1.114) (1.133) (1.195) (0.703) (0.197) (0.221)
Paramedical care -3.529*** -4.032*** 1.229 0.592 0.366 0.418*
(1.262) (1.283) (1.353) (0.796) (0.223) (0.250)
Graded return 10.606*** 11.005*** -8.124*** -2.890*** -0.124 0.083
(0.899) (0.915) (0.965) (0.567) (0.159) (0.178)
Panel B: During 2nd year after random assignment (N=4,728)
Traditional activation -2.126 -2.857** -1.332 0.119 0.211 2.180***
(1.338) (1.364) (1.025) (0.988) (0.537) (0.561)
Paramedical care -5.118*** -6.193*** 1.811 1.077 1.242** 0.871
(1.516) (1.544) (1.161) (1.119) (0.608) (0.635)
Graded return 9.216*** 8.701*** -3.355*** -3.496*** -1.576*** 0.210
(1.080) (1.101) (0.827) (0.798) (0.434) (0.453)
Panel C: During 3rd year after random assignment (N=4,720)
Traditional activation -1.178 -2.349* -0.502 -1.215 0.112 2.564***
(1.391) (1.406) (0.811) (1.010) (0.768) (0.786)
Paramedical care -2.833* -3.633** -0.613 1.251 2.445*** 0.880
(1.572) (1.590) (0.917) (1.142) (0.868) (0.889)
Graded return 8.091*** 7.025*** -0.517 -3.519*** -2.368*** -0.146
(1.122) (1.134) (0.654) (0.814) (0.619) (0.634)
Notes: First robustness test. The table shows the estimated eﬀects of participating in alternative treatment
activities (local average treatment eﬀects). Each panel is based on six separate IV/2SLS regressions (second
stage). See notes to Table 5 for a description of the outcome variables. Included instruments: see Table A2
and Table A3 in the Appendix; week of intake dummies. Excluded instruments: vector of local treatment
strategy characteristics ('i). F test of excluded instruments (first stage): traditional activation: 2,007.29;
paramedical care: 839.18; graded return: 2,837.23. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
As a second test of robustness, let us pretend that the experiment did not take place. In the
absence of the experimental intervention, all sick-listed workers would have received treatment
as usual, i.e., “control group treatment”, and for this second robustness test, we only use “control
group data”. One can consider this robustness check to be the analysis we would have undertaken
23Note that the statistics shown in Table 7 are of smaller magnitude than those reported in Table 6. It is worth
noting that this does not cast doubt on the reliability of the estimates. By changing the way a local treatment
environment is defined, we end up with a diﬀerent set of instruments, which may be associated with a diﬀerent
compliant subpopulation and thus diﬀerent LATEs (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
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Table 8: Eﬀects of participating in alternative treatment activities (LATE) evaluated at diﬀerent points in time
after randomization using control group data only (IV/2SLS)
Dependent variable: Number of weeks in ...
I II III IV V VI
Regular
employ-
ment
Self-
suﬃciency
Sickness Unemploy-
ment
Early
retirement
Fleksjob
Panel A: During 1st year after random assignment (N=2,304)
Traditional activation 1.266 -21.257 -11.582 19.868 0.110 3.680
(24.452) (24.599) (26.406) (15.529) (3.636) (3.885)
Paramedical care -42.899 -50.258* 54.086* 6.216 -2.025 -1.363
(28.897) (29.070) (31.206) (18.352) (4.296) (4.591)
Graded return 18.991 8.493 -16.335 8.698 0.134 -2.754
(12.080) (12.152) (13.044) (7.671) (1.796) (1.919)
Panel B: During 2nd year after random assignment (N=2,304)
Traditional activation -34.025 -36.207 -13.958 27.092 5.141 10.010
(28.503) (29.665) (22.464) (22.195) (11.047) (10.604)
Paramedical care -12.943 -39.734 35.473 -21.887 20.719 2.284
(33.684) (35.057) (26.547) (26.229) (13.055) (12.532)
Graded return 6.178 -0.098 -15.939 13.628 0.860 -4.076
(14.080) (14.655) (11.097) (10.964) (5.457) (5.239)
Panel C: During 3rd year after random assignment (N=2,297)
Traditional activation -19.581 -6.528 -19.304 -0.950 10.070 23.426
(29.738) (29.972) (19.554) (21.476) (17.719) (16.647)
Paramedical care -5.076 -24.484 6.468 -4.116 38.658* -5.539
(34.357) (34.628) (22.592) (24.811) (20.472) (19.233)
Graded return 11.914 12.720 -15.767 4.051 7.506 -3.900
(14.783) (14.899) (9.721) (10.676) (8.808) (8.275)
Notes: Second robustness test. The table shows the estimated eﬀects of participating in alternative treat-
ment activities (local average treatment eﬀects). Each panel is based on six separate IV/2SLS regressions
(second stage). See notes to Table 5 for a description of the outcome variables. Included instruments: see
Table A2 and Table A3 in the Appendix; week of intake dummies. Excluded instruments: vector of local
treatment strategy characteristics ('i). F test of excluded instruments (first stage): traditional activation:
7.14; paramedical care: 8.34; graded return: 9.24. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
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were this an observational study like that of Markussen and Røed (2014). At the same time,
assuming away the trial is a neat way of showing that we are—in our original analysis—benefiting
from the additional truly random variation in treatment strategies induced by the experiment.
Now, recall that control group members are distributed across 16 job centers (Table A1 in
Appendix). Hence we now focus on the variation in treatment strategies across 16 local treatment
environments. The results of this are shown in Table 8. Note first that the eﬀects reported here
tend to be in the same direction as our main results: only every fifth coeﬃcient changed sign
compared to the benchmark (Table 6). However, few of the estimates displayed in Table 8 are
statistically significant at conventional levels. For one thing, the precision loss might be caused by
the sample size reduction (given that we are now using only “control group data”). For another,
it may arise from the reduced extent of exploitable variation in local treatment strategies. Given
these considerations, one might interpret the results shown in Table 8 in the following way: while
the direction of the eﬀects is (by and large) accurately measured, the variation in treatment
strategies in the control group is too small to derive statistically significant estimates, given the
relatively small sample size. Precision could be increased either by increasing the sample size
(a large scale observational study, like Markussen and Røed (2014)) or by exploiting additional
truly random variation in treatment strategies (as we do in our original analysis). Viewed this
way, the results from this second robustness test serve a dual purpose. First, they substantiate
our previous findings, and second, they illustrate that we are benefiting from the additional truly
random variation in treatment strategies—a unique characteristic of the paper at hand.
The third robustness check is intended to test whether our results still apply when an alterna-
tive set of instruments is used. The instruments used so far were derived from a competing risks
transition rate model: we used the (leave-out) mean covariate-adjusted transition propensities
(into alternative treatment activities) of all sick-listed workers within a particular local treatment
environment as instruments for program participation (see Section 4.2). The instruments used
in this robustness test are simpler to construct. To construct the instruments, we estimate—
separately for each of the three alternative treatments—the following linear probability model
(one observation per sick-listed worker):
PSi = 0 +XiS +XjS +CS + uSij (7)
where PSi (S=traditional activation, paramedical care, graded return-to-work) are indicators
of actual treatment receipt (PSi equals unity in case of participation in treatment activity S,
zero otherwise); Xi is a vector of individual pre-treatment characteristics; Xj is a vector of
municipality-level controls; and C is a vector of “center dummies”—one for each local treatment
environment. Note that the (32) elements of S can be interpreted as covariate-adjusted indica-
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tors of a local treatment environment’s inclination to use treatment S. Therefore, S provides
a natural proxy for intrinsically unobserved local treatment cultures of diﬀerent treatment envi-
ronments. Pursuant to the rationale discussed in Section 4.2, it can be argued that these proxies
for “local area practice styles” provide legitimate instruments for the potentially endogenous pro-
gram participation indicators. Table 9 below reports local average treatment eﬀects estimated
by using S as instrument for PSi (see equation (6) for the structural model). It can immediately
be seen that the estimates reported here correspond quite well with our main results (Table 6).
Table 9: Eﬀects of participating in alternative treatment activities (LATE) evaluated at diﬀerent points in time
after randomization using center fixed eﬀects as instruments for treatment participation (IV/2SLS)
Dependent variable: Number of weeks in ...
I II III IV V VI
Regular
employ-
ment
Self-
suﬃciency
Sickness Unemploy-
ment
Early
retirement
Fleksjob
Panel A: During 1st year after random assignment (N=4,688)
Traditional activation -3.174 -3.280 -1.178 2.628* 0.449 0.782*
(2.334) (2.354) (2.510) (1.464) (0.409) (0.471)
Paramedical care -3.852** -3.858** 2.917 -0.058 0.158 0.758**
(1.747) (1.762) (1.879) (1.095) (0.306) (0.353)
Graded return 14.388** 12.009** -12.196* -0.559 0.225 -2.177*
(5.835) (5.885) (6.275) (3.659) (1.022) (1.178)
Panel B: During 2nd year after random assignment (N=4,688)
Traditional activation -3.553 -1.708 -2.171 1.780 0.626 1.196
(2.829) (2.839) (2.128) (2.126) (1.116) (1.168)
Paramedical care -5.799*** -6.485*** 1.089 3.785** 1.049 1.405
(2.117) (2.125) (1.592) (1.591) (0.835) (0.875)
Graded return 18.750*** 12.195* -1.520 -14.042*** -0.040 -3.251
(7.072) (7.097) (5.319) (5.314) (2.790) (2.922)
Panel C: During 3rd year after random assignment (N=4,680)
Traditional activation -5.012* -2.692 -0.934 -0.201 0.894 0.579
(2.932) (2.932) (1.702) (2.116) (1.598) (1.639)
Paramedical care -1.216 -1.522 -1.432 1.897 1.976* 1.160
(2.178) (2.177) (1.264) (1.571) (1.187) (1.217)
Graded return 15.302** 7.587 3.395 -7.642 -2.345 -2.314
(7.266) (7.264) (4.217) (5.244) (3.960) (4.061)
Notes: Third robustness test. The table shows the estimated eﬀects of participating in alternative treat-
ment activities (local average treatment eﬀects). Each panel is based on six separate IV/2SLS regressions
(second stage). See notes to Table 5 for a description of the outcome variables. Included instruments: see
Table A2 and Table A3 in the Appendix; week of intake dummies. Excluded instruments: center fixed
eﬀects; one center had to be excluded due to perfect multicollinearity in the linear probability model used
to construct the instruments. F test of excluded instruments (first stage): traditional activation: 251.40;
paramedical care: 540.22; graded return: 33.26. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
6 Conclusion
This paper has provided new and important evidence relating to the eﬀects of intensive manda-
tory return-to-work activities on sick-listed workers’ subsequent labor market outcomes. We
have used a unique dataset from a large-scaled randomized experiment conducted in Danish job
30
centers in 2009, linked to large administrative registers.
We first evaluated the intention-to-treat eﬀect of the intensified activation package as a whole
(weekly meetings with caseworkers combined with graded return-to-work, traditional activation
and/or paramedical care) by simply comparing the average labor market outcomes of treated
and non-treated (“diﬀerence in means”). Second, we have exploited variations in local treatment
strategies, both between job centers and between treatment and control groups within a given
job center—in spirit of Markussen and Røed (2014)—to compare the relative eﬀectiveness of the
alternative measures.
Our findings reveal first that the experimental intervention as a whole has been ineﬀective.
Sick-listed workers initially assigned to the treatment group spent less time in regular employment
and self-suﬃciency (i.e., all forms of non-benefit receipt) compared to their peers in the control
group who benefited from the usual forms of intervention. Nevertheless, our results also show
that oﬀering graded return-to-work programs more intensively is associated with an increase in
regular employment and self-suﬃciency, and a decrease in unemployment. Traditional activation
and paramedical care, on the other hand, appear to have either no or even adverse impacts.
Taken together, our results thus suggest that graded return-to-work programs are the most
eﬀective intervention for improving sick-listed workers’ subsequent labor outcomes. When in-
tensified, they are associated with strong and lasting eﬀects, for sick-listed workers who were
employed before becoming sick and who do not suﬀer from mental disorders. Therefore, our
results support a greater reliance on graded return-to-work programs to help sick-listed individ-
uals to return to work as quickly as possible. Recent medical research also finds in favor of an
increased emphasis on graded return-to-work (see e.g., Waddell and Burton (2006)).
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Appendix A
Table A1: Number of individuals by employment region, job center and treatment status
Employment region, job center Control group Treatment group Total
Panel A: Region Zealand (N=1,902)
Bornholm 177 212 389
Gentofte 48 49 97
Greve 204 237 441
København 206 250 456
Ringsted 174 191 365
Vordingborg 73 81 154
Panel B: North Denmark Region (N=525)
Aalborg 210 215 425
Morsø 50 50 100
Panel C: Central Denmark Region (N=913)
Randers 136 114 250
Holstebro 231 116 347
Herning 98 100 198
Horsens 58 60 118
Panel D: Region of Southern Denmark (N=2,312)
Svendborg 114 167 281
Nyborg 191 185 376
Odense 482 506 988
Aabenraa 343 324 667
Total 2,795 2,857 5,652
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Table A2: Pre-treatment characteristics by treatment status (N=4,728)
Variable Control group Treatment group Diﬀerence
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Panel A: Socio-demographic characteristics
< 30 years old 0.150 (0.357) 0.137 (0.343) -0.014
30-39 years old 0.234 (0.423) 0.218 (0.413) -0.015
40-49 years old 0.273 (0.446) 0.286 (0.452) 0.013
> 49 years old 0.343 (0.475) 0.359 (0.480) 0.016
Male 0.433 (0.496) 0.457 (0.498) 0.024
Married 0.583 (0.493) 0.570 (0.495) -0.013
Danish origin 0.878 (0.327) 0.876 (0.329) -0.002
Western origin 0.045 (0.207) 0.050 (0.217) 0.005
Non-western origin 0.077 (0.267) 0.074 (0.262) -0.003
Panel B: Labor market history
Sick-listed from regular empl. 0.777 (0.416) 0.743 (0.437) -0.034***
Sick-listed from UI-benefits 0.160 (0.366) 0.194 (0.395) 0.034***
Sick-listed from self-empl. 0.063 (0.243) 0.063 (0.242) -0.000
Elapsed sickness durationa 8.902 (6.235) 8.601 (6.082) -0.300*
Time spent on sickness-ben.b 0.212 (0.143) 0.208 (0.145) -0.003
Time spent on sickness-ben.c 0.080 (0.176) 0.080 (0.175) -0.000
Time spent on sickness-ben.d 0.069 (0.163) 0.063 (0.156) -0.006
Degree of pub. inc. supportb e 0.311 (0.251) 0.317 (0.259) 0.006
Degree of pub. inc. supportc e 0.216 (0.314) 0.213 (0.314) -0.003
Degree of pub. inc. supportd e 0.240 (0.338) 0.232 (0.332) -0.007
Panel C: Diagnoses
Back and neck disorders 0.152 (0.359) 0.164 (0.370) 0.011
Moving incapacity 0.196 (0.397) 0.206 (0.405) 0.011
Musculoskeletal disorders 0.038 (0.192) 0.047 (0.213) 0.009
Cardiovascular diseases 0.047 (0.211) 0.048 (0.214) 0.001
Stomach/liver/kidney diseases 0.033 (0.179) 0.033 (0.179) 0.000
Mental health problems 0.334 (0.472) 0.319 (0.466) -0.015
Chronic pain 0.007 (0.083) 0.009 (0.097) 0.003
Cancer 0.033 (0.177) 0.040 (0.197) 0.008
Other 0.160 (0.367) 0.132 (0.339) -0.028***
Number of observations 2,304 2,424
a at start of experiment (in weeks) b in year before sickness c in second last year before sickness d in
third last year before sickness e any kind of public income support.
Significance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
35
Table A3: Municipality-level controls used both in competing risks model and in main outcome equation (local
treatment strategies approach)
Variable Description
Panel A: Socio-demographic characteristics
avage Average age
fertil Total fertility rate
lifeexp Life expectancy for new born babies
danes Persons of Danish origin in % of the population
lowedu Percentage of working-age population with no more than ten years of schooling
migra1 External net migration in % of the population
migra2 Internal net migration in % of the population
crime Reported criminal oﬀences per capita
Panel B: Local labor market conditions
unemp Full-time unemployed persons in % of the labor force
sbens1 Persons receiving sickness benefits (w/ job) in % of the working-age population
sbens2 Persons receiving sickness benefits (w/o job) in % of the working-age population
lfpart Economic activity rate (labor force participation)
outlf Percentage of working-age population outside the labor force
prisec Persons employed in primary sector in % of the population
vacs1 Number of open vacancies per unemployed
vacs2 Number of newly opened vacancies per unemployed
Notes: Data on all variables (except for vacs1 and vacs2 ) stem from Statistics Denmark, Denmark’s
national statistics institute.
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Table A4: Eﬀects of participating in alternative treatment activities (LATE) evaluated at diﬀerent points in
time after randomization by labor market status before sickness (IV/2SLS)
Dependent variable: Number of weeks in ...
I II III IV V VI
Regular
employ-
ment
Self-
suﬃciency
Sickness Unemploy-
ment
Early
retirement
Fleksjob
Panel A: Labor market status before sickness: Regular employment
Panel A1: During 1st year after random assignment (N=3,593)
Traditional activation -4.896 -3.413 -1.712 3.438* 0.552 1.375
(3.932) (3.741) (3.964) (1.852) (0.526) (0.883)
Paramedical care -9.990** -9.896** 8.836** -2.060 0.318 2.449***
(4.138) (3.936) (4.171) (1.948) (0.554) (0.930)
Graded return 36.255** 31.223** -32.384** 3.446 0.650 -7.333**
(14.543) (13.833) (14.660) (6.848) (1.945) (3.267)
Panel A2: During 2nd year after random assignment (N=3,593)
Traditional activation -4.193 -0.287 -2.460 2.568 -0.242 2.166
(4.103) (3.987) (2.901) (2.610) (1.535) (1.833)
Paramedical care -9.454** -10.832*** 4.597 1.749 0.706 4.447**
(4.318) (4.196) (3.053) (2.747) (1.615) (1.929)
Graded return 26.203* 20.595 -13.074 -9.846 4.192 -12.261*
(15.174) (14.746) (10.728) (9.654) (5.675) (6.780)
Panel A3: During 3rd year after random assignment (N=3,588)
Traditional activation -7.247* -3.890 -0.365 1.337 -0.603 1.912
(4.352) (4.318) (2.181) (2.667) (2.160) (2.499)
Paramedical care -4.892 -7.580* 0.389 -1.388 1.236 5.278**
(4.605) (4.569) (2.308) (2.822) (2.286) (2.645)
Graded return 28.269* 26.934* -4.043 -1.991 4.474 -16.558*
(16.264) (16.134) (8.152) (9.967) (8.071) (9.340)
Panel B: Labor market status before sickness: Unemployment
Panel B1: During 1st year after random assignment (N=838)
Traditional activation -0.681 -0.329 1.857 1.526 -0.580 0.087
(3.288) (3.535) (5.200) (4.220) (1.210) (0.590)
Paramedical care -1.579 -1.604 -0.517 -2.321 0.358 0.762
(3.286) (3.533) (5.196) (4.217) (1.210) (0.589)
Graded return 0.464 -16.020 44.974 26.351 -18.111 -8.015
(48.671) (52.337) (76.974) (62.464) (17.917) (8.730)
Panel B2: During 2nd year after random assignment (N=838)
Traditional activation -6.925 -4.427 4.205 2.024 -0.856 -0.124
(4.761) (5.515) (4.841) (5.601) (2.566) (2.625)
Paramedical care 2.498 0.874 -3.581 0.057 0.196 4.346*
(4.758) (5.512) (4.838) (5.597) (2.564) (2.623)
Graded return -44.981 -71.754 19.302 46.755 5.994 -22.836
(70.473) (81.641) (71.669) (82.910) (37.981) (38.854)
Panel B3: During 3rd year after random assignment (N=835)
Traditional activation -5.403 -2.365 4.992 -6.319 2.117 1.954
(5.213) (5.454) (5.258) (5.641) (3.976) (3.468)
Paramedical care 4.302 -0.143 -7.702 9.036 -1.722 2.705
(5.189) (5.429) (5.234) (5.616) (3.958) (3.452)
Graded return -59.668 -58.421 90.707 -63.715 42.490 -1.651
(76.900) (80.452) (77.554) (83.215) (58.647) (51.155)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
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Table A5: Eﬀects of participating in alternative treatment activities (LATE) evaluated at diﬀerent points in
time after randomization by sickness type (IV/2SLS)
Dependent variable: Number of weeks in ...
I II III IV V VI
Regular
employ-
ment
Self-
suﬃciency
Sickness Unemploy-
ment
Early
retirement
Fleksjob
Panel A: Sickness type: Non-mental sickness
Panel A1: During 1st year after random assignment (N=3,184)
Traditional activation -4.275 -4.743 1.588 2.321 0.791 1.658
(3.802) (3.776) (3.881) (1.971) (0.617) (1.036)
Paramedical care -6.560* -6.144* 4.777 -1.789 0.005 2.129**
(3.501) (3.477) (3.574) (1.815) (0.568) (0.954)
Graded return 30.801** 28.375* -25.392 0.511 1.267 -10.177**
(15.312) (15.208) (15.631) (7.936) (2.483) (4.170)
Panel A2: During 2nd year after random assignment (N=3,184)
Traditional activation -6.049 -6.025 1.812 2.211 0.945 1.949
(4.228) (4.241) (3.277) (3.071) (1.729) (1.994)
Paramedical care -7.342* -7.272* 3.759 2.452 0.552 3.205*
(3.893) (3.905) (3.018) (2.828) (1.593) (1.836)
Graded return 27.197 23.607 -19.251 -19.809 5.410 -12.903
(17.028) (17.081) (13.198) (12.369) (6.965) (8.029)
Panel A3: During 3rd year after random assignment (N=3,181)
Traditional activation -7.602 -5.802 0.478 1.556 0.897 2.039
(4.647) (4.435) (2.573) (3.015) (2.320) (2.470)
Paramedical care -3.882 -3.129 1.729 1.459 2.473 2.038
(4.273) (4.078) (2.366) (2.772) (2.133) (2.271)
Graded return 35.566* 26.155 -12.268 -16.986 0.240 -9.422
(18.597) (17.752) (10.297) (12.066) (9.283) (9.886)
Panel B: Sickness type: Mental sickness
Panel B1: During 1st year after random assignment (N=1,544)
Traditional activation -1.284 5.830 2.141 -10.680 1.170 2.952
(21.214) (21.007) (60.340) (72.118) (8.751) (12.660)
Paramedical care -8.616 -0.177 28.233 -31.032 4.343 6.200
(42.464) (42.048) (120.781) (144.360) (17.516) (25.341)
Graded return 36.272 -16.177 -139.830 165.143 -19.951 -29.125
(219.939) (217.785) (625.578) (747.704) (90.724) (131.251)
Panel B2: During 2nd year after random assignment (N=1,544)
Traditional activation 3.549 18.189 -38.318 21.028 -0.846 11.731
(26.561) (63.758) (129.939) (58.765) (9.985) (49.175)
Paramedical care 2.487 18.562 -57.365 27.807 4.719 24.052
(53.166) (127.623) (260.097) (117.628) (19.988) (98.432)
Graded return -25.376 -132.725 303.553 -137.756 -14.903 -115.386
(275.368) (661.013) (1347.146) (609.241) (103.524) (509.820)
Panel B3: During 3rd year after random assignment (N=1,539)
Traditional activation 15.504 24.716 -37.859 -28.692 -22.179 30.706
(155.994) (197.655) (324.129) (270.304) (186.662) (289.803)
Paramedical care 32.379 38.549 -76.287 -59.552 -40.507 68.841
(318.409) (403.438) (661.598) (551.730) (381.007) (591.543)
Graded return -172.082 -225.795 391.907 319.714 221.979 -348.506
(1,668.178) (2,113.648) (3,466.182) (2,890.555) (1,996.136) (3,099.160)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
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Figure A1: Traditional activation, paramedical care and graded return-to-work intensities by job center, treat-
ment status and labor market status before sickness
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Notes: Indices 1 to 16 on the horizontal axes refer to job centers: (1) Bornholm, (2) Gentofte, (3) Greve, (4)
København, (5) Ringsted, (6) Vordingborg, (7) Aalborg, (8) Morsø, (9) Randers, (10) Holstebro, (11) Herning,
(12) Horsens, (13) Svendborg, (14) Nyborg, (15) Odense and (16) Aabenraa. Traditional activation intensities
are calculated as the average number of traditional activation weeks per individual in the first 20 weeks after
enrolment. Similarly for paramedical care intensities. Graded return intensities are calculated as the proportion
of individuals participating in a graded return-to-work program within the first 20 weeks.
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Figure A2: Trajectory of treatment eﬀects by labor market status before sickness (cumulative total intention-
to-treat eﬀects)
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Panel (A): Labor market status before sickness: Regular employment (N=4,412 )
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Panel (B): Labor market status before sickness: Unemployment (N=894)
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Panel (C): Labor market status before sickness: Self−employment (N=346)
Intention−to−treat effect 95% confidence interval
Notes: See notes to Figure 2.
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Figure A3: Trajectory of treatment eﬀects by degree of benefit dependency in the year prior to assignment
(cumulative total intention-to-treat eﬀects)
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Panel (A): Best qrtl. (N=1,455)
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Panel (B): 2nd qrtl. (N=1,512)
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Panel (C): 3rd qrtl. (N=1,312)
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Panel (D): Worst qrtl. (N=1,373)
Intention−to−treat effect 95% confidence interval
Notes: See notes to Figure 2.
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